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Abstract 
This study examines whether investor protection affects capital markets, specifically the 
development of corporate bond markets versus equity markets. Using a dataset of 42 
countries, we show that countries with strong creditor rights have more developed 
corporate bond markets than equity markets. However, we find only weak evidence that 
countries with stronger shareholder protection have more developed equity markets than 
corporate bond markets. Additionally, we find that the effect of financial reforms on 
capital markets is strongly dependent on the strength of investor protection and associated 
information disclosure in a given country. 
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1. Introduction 
In their seminal paper, La Porta et al. (1998) document that legal origins influence a 
country’s law regarding creditor and shareholder rights, its level of bank credit, and its 
stock market development. Their results indicated that equity markets are more likely to 
be established in countries with common law origins than those with civil law origins. 
Well-developed equity markets, in turn, facilitate securing financing for firms’ 
investments (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
Thus far, the literature has primarily concentrated on equity markets and the 
development of the structure of capital markets, even though corporate bond markets are 
an important aspect of capital markets. According to Tendulkar and Hancock (2014), 
corporate bond markets have almost tripled in size since 2000, reaching $49 trillion in 
2013. Although growth slowed as banks began to deleverage their balance sheets 
following the 2008 financial crisis, the amount outstanding from non-financial firms has 
continued to expand. Indeed, according to the “spare tire view,” a financial crisis can be 
mitigated if a country has the legal infrastructure that allows the capital market to provide 
alternative financing to firms when their banking systems cannot be used. Recently, 
Levine et al. (2016) showed that in countries with stronger shareholder protection laws, 
firms increase the volume of equity issuances in response to systematic banking crises. 
These findings are particularly strong for firms that depend heavily on external financing. 
Hence, shareholder protection ameliorates the adverse effects of banking crises by 
providing alternative financing through the equity market. 
In response to a banking crisis, due to similar characteristics to bank loans, corporate 
bonds are more suitable than equity for firms in need of alternative financing (Boyd and 
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Smith, 1998). On average, the bond yield is lower than the bank interest rate for even the 
lowest-risk borrowers, but bond issuance is limited to firms with large sales revenues 
(Russ and Valderrama, 2012). The higher marginal cost of bank lending stems from the 
specialization of banks, which require significant resources to acquire information and 
monitor borrowers. In contrast, bonds are acquired by a dispersed pool of investors who 
cannot or choose not to monitor the activities of the issuers. This, therefore, is commonly 
also referred to as “unmonitored” lending (Russ and Valderrama, 2012). These 
differences may also explain why the corporate bond market is more resilient during 
recessions or times of financial distress than the banking sector. De Fiore and Uhlig 
(2015) showed, however, that during the financial crisis of 2008, the shift in corporate 
debt from bank finance to bonds was followed by an increased cost of debt securities 
relative to bank loans. More importantly, they documented that, unlike corporate bonds, 
bank loans generally behaved in a markedly procyclical manner during the financial 
crisis. De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) also showed that when firms have no access to the bond 
market, the negative effects on investment and causes for alarm that reduce bank 
profitability are amplified. Thus, developing the corporate bond market is important from 
a macroeconomic perspective because it reduces the adverse consequences on economic 
activity during periods of financial distress. However, it remains largely unknown why 
and how corporate bond markets develop across countries. 
The following study investigates how laws and legal institutions affect the 
development of corporate bond markets relative to that of equity markets using a sample 
of 42 developed and developing countries over the period 1978 to 2011. In this study, we 
employ several different measures as proxies for creditor and shareholder protection. We 
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also control for other legal factors, such as country legal origins, debt contract 
enforcement, and bond contract covenants. Existing research indicates that these legal 
factors are correlated with financial system development, and this link remains robust 
after controlling for religious composition and other national characteristics (Beck et al., 
2003). Lastly, we investigate the effects of financial crises on the relationship between 
law and capital market development (Allen et al., 2012). 
Our initial empirical strategy is to run cross-country regressions to determine the 
effects of creditor and shareholder rights on the development of the corporate bond 
market relative to that of the equity market. We control for the macroeconomic country 
characteristics that are likely to affect capital market development. We also employ a 
natural experiment with a generalized difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff, henceforth) 
estimator to explore whether a country’s financial reforms have had any effect on the 
association between law and the structural development of the capital market. This diff-
in-diff strategy avoids the econometric concern that institutional factors, such as creditor 
or shareholder rights, are endogenous, and it presents an alternative to the instrumental 
variable techniques that have been criticized by Djankov et al. (2007). 
Our results support the logic underlying the finance and law literature, which relate 
investor protection to the development and structure of financial systems. First, we find 
that countries with stronger creditor rights tend to have more developed corporate bond 
markets relative to the equity markets. Moreover, the results indicate that restrictive bond 
covenants, which serve as an alternative ex-post mechanism to protect bondholders, are 
primarily negatively associated with the development of the bond markets relative to the 
equity markets. Additionally, we demonstrate that countries with stronger debt contract 
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enforcement have more-developed corporate bond markets than stock markets, but 
information sharing is generally more beneficial for equity market development. 
Additionally, we find some evidence that shareholder protection predicts the 
development of the equity markets relative to the corporate bond markets. 
Second, we find that financial reforms lead to greater development in corporate bond 
markets than equity markets in countries that have stronger creditor protection. In 
contrast, our results indicate that financial system reforms in countries with stronger 
shareholder protection enhance the development of the equity markets more than the 
corporate bond markets. This suggests that the effect of the financial reforms is strongly 
dependent on the country’s legal system. In countries with stronger creditor protection, 
we find that financial reforms play a more important role to further corporate bond 
market development. Additionally, we document that greater information disclosure 
improves the effect of financial reforms on the development of capital markets. 
Third, we determine that the relationship between law and the capital market structure 
is weaker during banking crises than in normal periods. We find that the corporate bond 
markets develop faster than the equity markets, but only in the short term, during 
systematic banking crises. Additionally, we do not find significant evidence that the 
corporate bond markets develop faster than the equity markets during crises in countries 
with stronger creditor rights. Consequently, the observed association between the legal 
system and the structure of the capital market is partly offset during a crisis. Indeed, our 
results are in line with the findings of Allen et al. (2012), who documented significant 
short-term reversals in the development of financial system structures during a financial 
crisis. However, they indicated that, after a crisis, the financial system reverts to its 
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previous structure. Thus, we also assume that after a financial crisis the legal system still 
largely determines the structure of the capital market. 
Overall, our results document that legal factors are important in explaining the 
development of corporate bond markets versus equity markets across countries. We argue 
that in countries with stronger creditor rights, corporate bond markets are more developed 
than the stock markets during normal periods. Moreover, the effects of financial reforms 
on capital market development tend to depend on the legal system, particularly investor 
protection. 
Our study contributes to filling the gap in the literature regarding the effect of laws on 
financial system development. First, in contrast to previous studies, we use the corporate 
bond market instead of private bank credit and, hence, provide new insights into capital 
market development across countries. We find a strong relationship between creditor 
protection and corporate bond market development. Our results are in contrast to those of 
Musacchio (2008), who employed data from Brazil from 1885 to 2003 and found no 
stable long-term relationship between creditor protection and bond market development. 
In our study, however, we use a large dataset of countries, and consequently, the results 
are more general. Second, Allen et al. (2012) demonstrated that the corporate bond 
market moves in the same direction as bank credit and experiences a short-term reversal 
with the equity market during a banking crisis. However, they concentrated only on the 
structure of the financial system, whereas we present the effects of banking crises on the 
structure of capital markets. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the 
literature that indicates a link between legal origins and corporate bond market 
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development. In Section 3, we describe our data, and in Section 4, we present the 
methodology and the results. Finally, Section 5 offers our concluding remarks. 
2. Motivation 
In this section, we review several related strands of literature. To begin, we present a 
short review of the large body of empirical research on the effects of legal origins on 
financial system development. Next, we briefly discuss research that has connected 
financial reforms with financial system development. Finally, we review the empirical 
literature that has investigated the relationships between financial disclosure and financial 
system development. 
La Porta et al. (1998) differentiated countries with corporate law derived from legal 
origins in England, France, Germany, and Scandinavia. They showed that countries with 
English common law and French civil law origins lie at the extremes of legal protection; 
that is, countries with an English origin (French origin) provide the strongest (weakest) 
legal protection to both shareholders and creditors. Using this distinction, La Porta et al. 
(1998) found a positive relationship between shareholder protection and stock market 
financing. In line with these results, Ergungor (2004) showed that legal tradition 
determines the structure of a financial system, whereas Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2004) 
found that countries with strong protection for shareholder rights tend to have a more 
market-based financial system. Djankov et al. (2008b) confirmed the previous findings, 
and associated shareholder protection with stock market development. 
On the other hand, Levine (1999) found that financial intermediaries develop more in 
countries with legal systems that assign a higher priority to creditor rights. More recently, 
Djankov et al. (2007), using data from 129 countries, showed that better creditor rights 
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are associated with a higher ratio of private credit to gross domestic product (GDP). 
Additionally, they reported that the ratio of private credit to GDP increases following 
improvements in creditor rights, but there is little convergence in the scores of creditor 
rights among legal origins over a 25-year period. In contrast, La Porta et al. (1997) show 
that creditor rights do not have a strong influence on corporate debt over gross national 
product (GNP) based on a cross-sectional regression of 49 countries. Moreover, 
Musacchio (2008) did not find a strong relationship between creditor protection and bond 
market development in Brazil. He argued that creditor rights are necessary for bond 
market development, but the market’s further development is more influenced by 
international capital flows and macroeconomic stability than legal variables. 
Consequently, the existing empirical evidence on the relationship between creditor rights 
and bond markets is limited and ambiguous. Considering this gap in evidence and 
understanding, therefore, we developed the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: In countries with stronger creditor rights, corporate bond markets are 
more developed than equity markets. 
Abiad and Mody (2005) documented that financial reforms have advanced despite 
stops and reversals in the last quarter century. Moreover, they found that when initial 
reforms occurred, the financial sector became only partially repressed, and the likelihood 
of further reforms increased substantially. As the example of Japan shows, financial 
liberalization that aimed to develop the government bond market created demand for 
reduced restrictions on the corporate bond market. Consequently, the financial reforms in 
those years induced the development of the corporate bond market. 
Financial reforms often involve removing the administrative controls that restrain 
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credit growth, which can result in a subsequent lending boom. Tornell and Westermann 
(2002) confirmed that financial liberalization is followed by a lending boom, but also 
reported that the boom can end with a simultaneous crisis in currency and banking. 
Notably, the lending boom usually ends with “a soft landing,” whereby credit gradually 
decelerates. Moreover, the authors argued that the financial flows after financial 
liberalization do not occur through equity or bond markets, because of severe 
enforceability problems. Thus, the previous results of analyzing the effects of financial 
reforms on capital market development are ambiguous, allowing us to develop the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Financial system reforms enhance corporate bond market development in 
countries with stronger creditor rights. 
In the pure adverse selection model developed by Pagano and Jappelli (1993), 
information sharing improves the pool of borrowers, decreases defaults, and reduces the 
average interest rate. Hence, information sharing can improve the functioning of the 
market and increase the volume of lending. Levine (1999) found a strong positive link 
between financial intermediary development and information disclosure, and an even 
stronger relationship between creditor rights and information disclosure. Jappelli and 
Pagano (2002) showed that bank lending is approximately twice as large in countries 
where lenders share information. Thus, previous results show that information disclosure 
is significant, and we assume that it may influence the effects of financial reforms. In line 
with our second hypothesis, we expect that in countries with stronger creditor rights and 
proper information disclosure, further institutional reforms in the securities market should 
significantly improve corporate bond market development. In formulating this hypothesis, 
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we assume that investor protection and information theories serve as substitution 
mechanisms for market development (Djankov et al., 2007); that is, both improved 
information sharing ex ante or ad interim and strong creditor rights or shareholder rights 
ex post can reduce market friction and develop corporate bond markets or equity markets. 
Thus, we developed the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Improved information disclosure advances the effectiveness of 
institutional reforms on the securities markets. 
According to Greenspan (2000), the existence of legal infrastructure and multiple 
avenues of financial intermediation can buffer shocks from a financial crisis. In his 
opinion, the United States capital markets replaced bank access following the collapse in 
the value of real estate collateral in the 1990s. Conversely, in 1998, following the default 
of Russian financial institutions, commercial banks replaced the intermediation function 
of the capital markets. Therefore, Greenspan (2000) argued that a diversified financial 
system could maintain an adequate degree of financial intermediation even if the main 
source of intermediation, whether banks or capital markets, freezes during a financial 
crisis. 
Allen et al. (2012) empirically confirmed that there are reversals in the structure of 
the financial system during a financial crisis. Moreover, their results indicated that, after a 
crisis, the financial system reverts to its previous structure. Consequently, their results 
confirmed that different financial intermediaries could substitute for each other during a 
crisis. Additionally, Levine et al. (2016) documented that the stock market may provide 
financing during a banking crisis. However, they also confirmed that the legal 
infrastructure must be in place so the equity market can substitute for the banking system 
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during a crisis. In line with these results, we assume that in countries with strong creditor 
rights, the corporate bond market mitigates the adverse impact of a banking crisis. 
Therefore, we developed the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: During a banking crisis, corporate bond markets expand in countries with 
strong creditor rights. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We constructed the indicators of corporate bond and equity market development 
using a revised financial structure dataset from Beck et al. (2000), Beck et al. (2009), 
Čihák et al. (2012), and the World Bank database. The legal origin variables and the 
variables to control for creditor rights and shareholder rights are based on La Porta et al. 
(1998), and we used various sources to collect them. We control for bond covenant, 
information disclosure, and debt contract enforcement using the data of Abiad and Mody 
(2005). We employ data for the set of control variables for financial reforms from Abiad 
et al. (2010). Lastly, we use data from Laeven and Valencia (2013) to control for 
systemic banking crises. Since there is limited overlap between the datasets, we collected 
a sample of 42 developed and developing countries over the period 1978 to 2011. All 
variables and sources are presented in Table A1 in the appendix. 
3.1 Variable definitions 
3.1.1 Corporate bond market and equity market development 
The dependent variable Corporate bond to stock is the ratio of corporate bond market 
capitalization to equity market capitalization. Both corporate bond market and equity 
market capitalization variables measure the size of the market, and their relationship 
represents the structure of the capital market in a country. To measure robustness, we use 
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several alternative dependent variables: Public bond to stock, which is the ratio of the 
market value of the public bond market to the equity market; Bond to stock, which is the 
ratio of the market value of both the private and public bond market to the equity market; 
Non-financial corporate bond to stock, which is the ratio of the market value of the non-
financial corporate bonds to the equity market; and Number of the listed bonds to stocks, 
which is the ratio of the number of the listed bonds to listed firms in the equity market. 
Replicating the regressions using the alternative dependent variables, which measure 
the structure of capital market in different ways, yields only minor differences from our 
main results. Consequently, in the following sections, we discuss only some of the results 
of the robustness check, using the alternative dependent variables, for brevity. 
3.1.2 Legal determinants 
We assume that a country’s level of creditor protection determines corporate bond 
market development. We use the Creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007) as a 
proxy for country-level bondholder protection. The index, which ranges from zero (weak) 
to four (strong), measures the laws and regulations that limit expropriation from secured 
creditors in a country. This index remains remarkably stable over time and relevant in 
explaining patterns in total capital market development (Miller and Reisel, 2012). 
Creditor rights are an ex-post mechanism that protects bondholders during firm 
defaults. Therefore, we control additionally for restrictive covenants that limit the actions 
of managers prior to defaults and serve as ex-ante mechanisms to protect creditors. Miller 
and Reisel (2012) argued that bond contracts are more likely to include restrictive 
covenants in countries with weak creditor protection. Hence, both bond covenants and 
creditor rights contribute to investor protection and can be substitutes at the country level. 
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Following Miller and Reisel (2012), we proxy for Bond covenants using the average 
number of covenants attached to corporate bond contracts issued by non-U.S. firms. The 
proxy reflects covenants in three categories: restrictions on financing activities, 
restrictions on investment activities, and restrictions on payouts. The total possible 
number of covenants ranges between 0 and 13. 
Djankov et al. (2008a) documented that the efficiency of debt enforcement is an 
economically and statistically significant predictor of the development of debt markets 
across countries. We control for this by employing the variable Debt enforcement, which 
measures the amount required to enforce a debt contract. 
In contrast, shareholder protection may result in stock market development. We 
control for shareholder protection using three different proxies: anti-director rights, anti-
self-dealing, and anti-takeover provisions. The anti-director rights index (ADRI) of La 
Porta et al. (1998) aggregates six dimensions of shareholder protection rules. Of the six 
components, three are concerned with shareholder voting, namely, voting by mail, voting 
without blocking shares, and calling an extraordinary meeting. The three others are 
concerned with minority protection, namely, proportional board representation, 
preemptive rights, and judicial remedies. Pagano and Volpin (2005), however, criticized 
the ADRI for its ad hoc nature and mistakes in coding. In response, Djankov et al. (2008b) 
provided a Revised ADRI for 72 countries, which is more theoretically grounded and 
reliably weighted. Consequently, the results indicate that the correlation between the 
original and Revised ADRI was only 0.60. Spamann (2010) further improved the index by 
employing leading local lawyers and provided a Corrected ADRI for 46 countries. The 
corrected ADRI differed substantially from the original ADRI (ρ=0.53) and the Revised 
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ADRI (ρ=0.67). Spamann (2010) demonstrated that many empirical results established 
using the original index might not be replicable with the Corrected ADRI. In particular, 
the corrected index failed to support the earlier findings that shareholder protection is 
stronger in common law countries than in civil law countries. Therefore, we use the 
Revised ADRI and the Corrected ADRI to control for the index’s potential limitations. 
Djankov et al. (2008b) introduced a new measure of legal protection of minority 
shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders, called the Anti-self-dealing 
index. The index covers both ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms that can limit anti-self-
dealing transactions, including disclosure and approval by minority shareholders, 
independent review, and standing to sue. Although both the ADRI and the Anti-self-
dealing index capture the strength of shareholder rights, they are significantly different. 
Djankov et al. (2008b) indicated that anti-director rights, not self-dealing, are the central 
problem of corporate governance in many countries. Thus, they suggested that generally, 
anti-self-dealing is preferable to the ADRI in cross-county studies. Additionally, the 
empirical evidence indicates that the Anti-self-dealing index is a more robust predictor of 
stock market development than the ADRI. 
We also use the Anti-takeover index developed by Nenova (2006), which captures the 
set of rules and regulations concerned with changes in corporate control, takeovers, 
tender offers, and general acquisition activity across countries. Nenova (2006) showed 
that effective takeover laws positively affect the number of listed companies, market 
capitalization, and value traded on stock exchanges, controlling for the general level of 
national economic growth. 
Empirical literature also suggests that legal origin is a concern for creditor rights and 
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shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 1998). Therefore, we control for the legal origin 
and employ the dummy variable L_English, which equals one if the country has an 
English common law legal origin and zero otherwise. Dummy variables for countries 
with French (L_French) and German civil law origins (L_German) are constructed 
identically. The few countries with Scandinavian civil law origins (L_Scandinavian) are 
captured in the regressions by the constant. 
Bae and Goyal (2009) showed that property rights might affect the development of 
the capital market. They documented that, in a debt contract, property rights protection 
affects a lender’s incentives to monitor and ability to re-contract. They showed that re-
contracting is costly even in countries with high creditor rights when they are poorly 
enforced. Therefore, we employ an index for Rule of law, which captures the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, and the courts. 
3.1.3 Other governance indicators 
We included three additional country-level governance factors that may influence the 
development of bond markets relative to equity markets. First, we employ a variable to 
control for corruption as this may distort the economic and financial environment. Bae 
and Goyal (2009) considered the impact of corruption when examining the relationship 
between creditor rights and bank loans. They found that corruption negatively determines 
the loan spreads, implying that laws and their enforcement have a substantial effect on 
borrowers’ cost of loans. In our study, the variable Corruption is from the World Bank 
database that measures the severity of corruption in a country by the extent to which the 
public power is exercised for private gain. The variable ranges from zero to 100, with 
higher scores representing less severe corruption problems. 
  
15 
 
Second, we control for the influence of Regulatory quality on capital market 
development. Allen et al. (2012) suggested that financial regulation affects the structure 
of financial systems during both normal and crisis periods. We use an index for 
Regulatory quality, which captures perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that promote private sector 
development. The index is from World Bank database and ranges from zero to 100. 
Third, we employ an index for Voice and accountability, which reflects the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
their freedom of association and media, among others. Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
propose a political economy view to understand the patterns of financial development. 
Similarly, Braun and Raddatz (2008) presented that the level of governance can affect 
financial system development through political factors. The index for Voice and 
accountability is from the World Bank database and ranges from zero to 100. 
3.1.4 Information disclosure and financial reforms 
Improved information disclosure contributes to credit market development (Jappelli 
and Pagano, 2002). La Porta et al. (2006) documented that the development of stock 
markets is strongly associated with extensive disclosure requirements. The Center for 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) created an index by rating the annual reports 
on the inclusion or omission of 90 items, which we employ to control for the level of 
Information disclosure across countries. 
The data on financial reforms come from the dataset of Abiad et al. (2010), which 
contains several indices related to specific financial reforms plus an aggregated index. 
The financial reform index is the sum of seven different dimensions: credit controls and 
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reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking 
sector, capital account restrictions, prudential regulations and supervision of the banking 
sector, and securities market policy. For each dimension, a country is graded from zero 
(high repression) to three (full liberalization); thus, the index calculates values between 0 
and 21. We employ a dummy variable, Financial reforms, which equals one if the first 
difference of the index is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable 
controls for years when there were policy changes in a country, whereas the values of the 
index are stable in most normal years. 
3.1.5 Banking crisis 
In a systemic banking crisis, non-performing loans increase dramatically, and much 
of the aggregate banking system capital is soon exhausted. As a result, a systematic 
banking crisis always leads to output losses in the economy. We use the starting dates of 
systemic banking crises provided by Laeven and Valencia (2013), focusing on the fact 
that the crises could lead to significant capital market development. Using this criterion, 
we identified 144 systemic banking crises across countries. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics  
In Table 1, Panel A, we present the descriptive statistics, which show a noticeable 
variation in the capital market measures across countries. The variable Corporate bond to 
stock exhibits high cross-sectional variability, ranging from 0.00 to 5.68 with a mean of 
0.58. The results indicate that, compared to stock market development, there are 
significant differences in the development of the corporate bond market across countries. 
The alternative variable Bond to stock, which additionally considers the public bond 
market, exhibits even higher variation, ranging from 0.00 to 9.52 with a mean of 1.44. 
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The alternative variables Non-financial corporate bond to stock ranges from 0.00 to 0.72 
with a mean of 0.05, and Number of listed bonds to stocks from 0.00 to 2.21 with a mean 
of 1.05. 
The variable Corporate bond to stock identifies Iceland, Ireland, Denmark, Austria, 
and Italy as having, on average, the highest corporate bond market capitalization relative 
to the equity market in the period 2007 to 2011. Conversely, Hong Kong, the Philippines, 
Luxembourg, Columbia, and Turkey have the lowest ratio of corporate bond market 
capitalization to stock market capitalization during this period. When we include the 
public bond market, the highest average ratios of bond market capitalization to stock 
market capitalization are observed in Italy, the Slovak Republic, Iceland, Austria, and 
Ireland, and the lowest in Chile, Switzerland, South Africa, Hong Kong, and 
Luxembourg during the years 2007 to 2011. 
The independent variables exhibit high cross-sectional variation, whereas the variable 
Creditor rights ranges from 0.00 to 4.00, with an average of 1.80. This indicates that the 
countries in our sample provide, on average, low protection to creditors. The results are 
strengthened by the Revised ADRI and Corrected ADRI, with average values of 3.37 and 
3.74, respectively. The Anti-self-dealing and Anti-takeover indexes average at 0.44 and 
0.46, respectively. 
[Table 1] 
Table 1, Panel B, presents a matrix of the correlation between the financial structure 
variables and the proxy variables for investor protection. As expected, the four regressors 
that proxy for capital market structure in terms of the relative development of the 
corporate bond market to stock market are highly correlated. We find that the variable 
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Public bond to stock is only weakly correlated with Non-financial corporate bond to 
stock and Number of listed bonds to stocks. On the one hand, the variable Creditor rights 
is significantly and positively related to the variables Corporate bond to stock and Non-
financial corporate bond to stock. On the other hand, it is insignificantly related to Public 
bond to stock, Bond to stock, and Number of listed bond to stock. Hence, the results 
indicate that overall creditor protection is important for the development of corporate 
bond markets. In contrast, we assume that public bond market development is driven 
more by the fiscal and monetary policy of the government. In line with our expectations, 
the variables for shareholder protection are significantly and negatively correlated with 
the variable Corporate bond to stock and Bond to stock. However, the correlations are 
mixed between the variables for shareholder protection and Non-financial corporate bond 
to stock and the Number of listed bonds to stock. The results of the descriptive statistics 
are consistent with our hypothesis that stronger creditor rights are positively associated 
with higher development of the corporate bond market relative to the equity market, 
whereas stronger shareholder protection has a negative effect on the development of the 
corporate bond market relative to the stock market. 
We examined the correlation between investor protection and other legal factors, but 
do not report the results for brevity. The correlation between creditor rights and 
shareholder rights is positive; typically, countries with well-developed legal systems and 
institutions provide similar protection to shareholders and creditors. Indeed, we find that 
an English legal origin is significantly and positively associated with both creditor rights 
and shareholder rights, whereas a French legal origin exhibits opposite correlations. A 
German legal origin indicates significantly positive correlations with creditor rights, but 
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mixed associations with shareholder rights. These results are in line with those of La 
Porta et al. (1998), who showed that all legal origins provide roughly the same protection 
to creditors and shareholders. Our results also confirm that countries with an English 
legal origin provide both shareholders and creditors the strongest protection and French 
civil law countries the weakest. The only exception is German civil law countries, which 
are more protective of creditors than shareholders. 
The variables Bond covenant and Enforcement exhibit significantly negative 
correlations with creditor rights. Hence, the results confirm that corporate bond contracts 
are more likely to include covenants in countries with weak creditor rights, which we 
assume would negatively affect the bond market development. Moreover, debt 
enforcement shows a positive relationship with shareholder and creditor protection. 
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1 Baseline model 
We begin our analysis by exploring the influence of creditor rights and shareholder 
rights on the structure of the capital market by employing random effects estimates using 
generalized least squares. 
(1) 
where  is the market value of the corporate bond market to 
the stock market,  and denote the set of proxy 
variables for creditor and shareholder protection, respectively,  denotes a vector of 
conditioning information that controls for legal factors, governance factors, and other 
variables of the macroeconomic environment, such as the log of GDP, the log of GDP per 
capita, inflation, and the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP. Variables  and 
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 are country and year fixed effects,  is the error term, and i and t denote country and 
time period, respectively. 
Random-effects estimates are more efficient than pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates and assume that country effects are uncorrelated with regressors, whereas 
fixed-effects models allow country effects to be correlated with regressors. Therefore, we 
employ both estimation methods to establish the effect of creditor rights on corporate 
bond market development. Although the variables of interest, such as creditor and 
shareholder protection, change over time, they are characterized by variations that are not 
sizable to be significant. Fixed-effects estimation requires significant within-group 
variations in the independent variable to generate a consistent and efficient estimator 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Thus, the fixed-effects estimator is prone to yielding imprecise 
coefficients for variables representing creditor and shareholder rights. Moreover, fixed 
effects can aggravate the problem of multicollinearity (Baltagi, 2005). Therefore, we 
report primarily the results of the random-effects method and the fixed-effects method as 
robustly as possible 2 . In the baseline-setting regressions, when the proxy for the 
development of corporate bond market versus equity market are used as the dependent 
variable, the independent variable of creditor rights is jointly significant at levels below 
1%. Thus, we do not comment further on these aspects. 
4.2 Baseline results 
Table 2 presents the results of the random-effects estimations. In specifications (1) 
through (4), we regress the explanatory variable Corporate bond to stock on the variable 
Creditor rights and then progressively change the extensive set of variables controlling 
 
2 For brevity, we do not report all the results for the fixed-effects estimations, but they are available upon 
request. The results based on fixed-effects estimators are similar to those obtained using the random-effects 
estimators. 
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for shareholder protection. To check the robustness of the results in specifications (5) 
through (8), we repeat the estimation using the regressor Public bond to stock, which 
captures the relative development of the public bond market to the stock market. For 
specifications (9) through (12) we employ the regressor Bond to stock, which includes 
both the public bond market and private bond market. In all regressions, we include 
macroeconomic control variables, such as the log of the GDP, the log of the GDP per 
capita, and inflation, as the exogenous macroeconomic situations of the country may 
determine the growth of the corporate bond market and stock market. In the regression, 
following Rajan and Zingales (2003), we control also for the ratio of the gross fixed 
capital formation to GDP (GFCF). Nini et al. (2009) document that creditors are more 
likely to impose a capital expenditure restriction, which can reduce firm investments. We 
assume that bond financing is likely to have similar characteristics as private debt. As a 
result, in countries with higher levels of gross fixed capital formation, firms may have 
lower bond financing relative to equity financing. Thus, the corporate bond market might 
be less developed than the stock market at the macro level. 
The regressions reveal that creditor rights are positively correlated to the corporate 
bond market development, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
all specifications. However, the coefficient for creditor rights is insignificant when we 
use the relative development of the public bond market to the stock market as the 
dependent variable. Thus, the results confirm that the level of creditor protection in a 
country is not relevant to the development of the public bond market. 
Adding proxies for shareholder protection does not significantly change the 
coefficient for the variable Creditor rights. In terms of economic magnitude, 
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specification (1) implies that an increase in the creditor rights index by one point results 
in an increase in the market capitalization of the corporate bond market relative to the 
equity market by 0.36%. This result implies that in countries where creditor rights are 
protected, represented by the higher value of the index, corporate bond markets are more 
developed. This finding is in accordance with Hypothesis 1. 
In Table 2, the coefficients for the different variables reflecting shareholder rights are 
negative and statistically significant in most of the specifications. These results imply that 
enhanced shareholder protection results in the development of the equity market relative 
to the corporate bond market. When the results are examined in more detail, the 
differences between the various shareholder rights indices are confirmed, including the 
two anti-director rights indexes. We find that the anti-takeover provisions are weak 
predictors of the development of the equity market because the coefficient for the 
variable Anti-takeover is statistically significant at only the 10% level and only in 
specification (4). Hence, the Corrected ADRI and Revised ADRI are better predictors of 
the development of the equity market relative to the bond market. However, only the 
coefficient for the Anti-self-dealing index is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
specifications (3) and (11). Therefore, this variable is the best predictor of equity market 
development. These results support the findings of Djankov et al. (2008b), who too 
reported that the Anti-self-dealing index is a more robust predictor than the Anti-director 
rights index. As a robustness check, we repeated the regressions using all the variables 
for shareholder protection as independent variables. The results show only very small 
changes in the coefficients and in significance. Hence, the results remain robust, but are 
not reported for brevity. 
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Most of the control variables included in the regressions have the expected signs but 
are insignificant. Only the coefficient for the variable GFCF is negative and significant in 
all the specifications. These results support the findings of Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
showing that the equity markets facilitate the growth of firms dependent on external 
finance. Adding control variables does not significantly change the coefficients of 
Creditor rights or the proxies for shareholder protection. 
There are slight differences in the number of observations in all the reported 
regressions as the Corrected ADRI and the Anti-takeover index is available for fewer 
countries compared to the other two indexes on shareholder rights. In addition, the 
alternative dependent variables are available for fewer as well as different countries 
compared to the dependent variable Corporate bond to stock. Consequently, the number 
of observations differs across our estimations, but does not appear to bias the results. 
[Table 2] 
We examined the robustness of the results by employing the alternative dependent 
variables Number of listed bonds to stocks and Non-financial corporate bond to stock. 
The former variable provides a measure that is not affected by fluctuations in stock and 
bond market valuations but is affected by the process of consolidation and by the 
fragmentation of the industrial structure. However, any single indicator of financial 
system development has its weaknesses (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Therefore, the 
indicators should be considered cumulatively for a better understanding of the country’s 
capital market structure. 
Table 3 shows that our results are not determined by the alternative dependent 
variable. The coefficient for Creditors rights remains positive and significant in all 
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specifications. Similarly, the sign and significance of the coefficients of the shareholder 
rights variables remain stable. The significance of the coefficients for the investor 
protection variables decreases when we employ the alternative dependent variable. 
 [Table 3] 
To further probe the robustness of the results, we employed fixed-effect estimations 
with different capital market structure indicators as the dependent variable. We use the 
variables Creditor rights and Corrected ADRI as independent variables as they are the 
only time-varying variables that proxy investor protection in a country. 
The fixed-effect model yields the same main results as our study. As shown in Table 
4, the coefficient for Creditor rights is positive and significant at the 1% level in all 
specifications. The coefficient of the proxy for shareholder protection remains negative 
but is statistically significant in only three of the six specifications. We further altered our 
model and employed the variable Stock market development as an additional control 
variable in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4. This variable does not affect the significance 
level or the sign of the estimated coefficients. These results confirm that creditor rights 
are an effective predictor of the development of the corporate bond market relative to the 
equity market, and even more effective when we control for the country fixed effects and 
stock market development. 
[Table 4] 
In Table 5, we present the results and control for the legal origins and other factors 
that may determine corporate bond market development. In columns (1) through (4), we 
control for the legal origins. Adding new control variables does not change the coefficient 
for Creditor rights, which remains statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the 
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coefficients of the proxies for shareholder protection have the expected sign but lose 
statistical significance. Only the coefficient for the Anti-self-dealing index is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
All coefficients for legal origins are negative but statistically significant only for 
the English common law, in almost all specifications. In contrast, the coefficients for 
German or French civil law are almost never significant or significant only at the 10% 
level. On one hand, these results confirm the finding of La Porta et al. (1998) that, 
although investor protection varies systematically across legal origins, it is higher in 
common law than in civil law countries. However, the negative coefficients for all legal 
origin dummies suggest that all legal origins protect shareholders more than creditors. 
These results are in line with Djankov et al. (2008b), who did not find a significant 
influence for legal origin on private credit. 
Next, we added control variables for the restrictive bond covenant, information 
disclosure, and days of debt contract enforcement. The results are presented in Table 5, 
columns (5) through (8). Surprisingly, none of the control variables are significantly 
related to corporate bond market development. However, the coefficient for Creditor 
rights barely changes after the new control variables are added, indicating that the 
additional variables do not contain information that affects corporate bond market 
development. In contrast, all proxies for shareholder protection lose significance. We thus 
conclude that creditor rights are more robust predictors of corporate bond market 
development than is shareholder protection for equity markets. In Table 5, columns (9) 
and (10), we employ a fixed-effect model for robustness check. The results show that 
creditor rights remain positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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[Table 5] 
For sensitivity analysis, we consider the potential impact from other governance 
factors, including corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality and voice, and accountability. 
Table 6 shows the results where we control for these additional factors and employ the 
fixed-effect model. We use Corporate bond to stock as the dependent variable in columns 
(1) through (4), and Non-financial corporate bond to stock in columns (5) through (8). 
Our results do not change with the additional variables, and the coefficient for the 
variable Creditor rights remains positive and significant. Conversely, the other 
governance indicators are negative but not significant. Overall, we find strong support for 
Hypothesis 1, which states that in countries with stronger creditor rights, corporate bond 
markets are more developed than equity markets. 
[Table 6] 
4.2 Financial reforms and corporate bond market development 
As Abiad and Mody (2005) documented, policy changes, especially those in 
emerging economies, tend to be episodic and embedded in a long process, leading to 
liberalization and, occasionally, reversals. It is difficult to identify the causal effect of 
reforms on financial development, due to its endogenous nature since the expected 
changes in financial development may cause its inclusion in reform policies, leading to a 
reverse causality concern. Therefore, we control for financial reforms by using an index 
that covers dimensions such as credit controls, reserve requirement, interest rate controls, 
entry barriers, state ownership in the banking sector, capital account restrictions, 
prudential regulations, supervision of the banking sector, and securities market policy. It 
is likely that the development of the bond market or stock market affects financial 
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policies, whereas we assume that the structure of the capital market is less likely to 
influence the financial policies on those dimensions. Therefore, we use a natural 
experiment using a diff-in-diff estimator to investigate the effect of financial reforms on 
the relationship between legal determinants and capital market structure. This 
methodology compares the effect of an event (a financial policy change) on groups that 
are more affected by policy changes (the treated group) with those that are less affected 
by the changes (the control group). We assume that financial reforms have a stronger 
effect on the development of corporate bond markets than equity markets in countries 
with higher creditor protection (Hypothesis 2). Therefore, we classify countries based on 
the pre-treatment level of creditor rights relative to shareholder rights. Countries are 
classified as treated groups when, according to the ratio, they are in the top third of the 
sample, and as control groups when they are in the bottom third of the sample. Using this 
methodology, we employ the following specification: 
(2) 
where Treated equals one if the country is in a treated group and zero otherwise; Post 
reform is a dummy variable that equals one in the first year after a financial reform and 
zero otherwise; and the diff-in-diff effect is captured by . 
Table 7 presents the effects of financial reform on the association between investor 
protection and corporate bond market development. We find that adding a diff-in-diff 
estimator does not change the main results as presented in Table 2. The relationship 
between creditor rights and capital market structure remains statistically significant, and 
the signs of the coefficients do not change. 
In all specifications, the coefficient for the interaction term Treated*Post reform is 
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positively related to corporate bond market development and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level, which indicates that in countries with stronger creditor protection than 
shareholder protection, financial reforms improve the development of the corporate bond 
market more than that of the equity market. Consequently, we find support for 
Hypothesis 2, which states that financial reforms promote corporate bond market 
development if the countries have stronger creditor rights. 
We tested the sensitivity of our results by introducing an interaction term between 
information disclosure and financial reform. The coefficient for the interaction term is 
positive and significant at the 5% level, which indicates that in countries with improved 
information disclosure, the effects of financial reforms are more significant for corporate 
bond market development, supporting Hypothesis 3. 
[Table 7] 
In Table 8, we further analyze the robustness of our results by adding an interaction 
term between the legal variables and the Post reform dummy. In columns (1) through (3), 
we interact the Post reform dummy with the proxies for investor protection. The 
coefficient for the interaction term with Creditor rights is positive and significant in all 
specifications. In contrast, the coefficient for the interaction term with the proxies for 
shareholder rights is negative but significant only for the variable Anti-self-dealing. 
Overall, the results show that the relationships between legal determinants and capital 
market development do not change after financial reforms. Stronger creditor protection is 
a predictor of corporate bond market development, whereas stronger shareholder 
protection is a predictor of equity market development. However, once again, the results 
show that among the proxies for shareholder protection, the variable Anti-self-dealing is 
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the best predictor of equity market development. 
In Table 8, columns (4) through (6), we add a triple interaction, including investor 
protection, a post reform dummy, and information disclosure. We assume that cross-
sectional heterogeneity may exist among countries, such as information disclosure 
systems or other related regulatory and supervisory factors. We therefore expect that in 
countries with better information disclosure, the effects of financial reform may be more 
significant, as stated in Hypothesis 3. The coefficients for the interaction terms that 
include Creditor rights are positive and significant in all specifications, confirming 
Hypothesis 3. Conversely, the coefficients for the interaction terms that include the 
proxies for shareholder protection are negative and statistically significant only for the 
variables Revised ADRI and Anti-self-dealing. On the one hand, the results indicate that 
financial reforms are more effective in countries with better information sharing. On the 
other hand, the results also show that information sharing is important only in countries 
characterized by high investor protection because the coefficient for Information 
disclosure is insignificant, as shown in Table 5. 
Lastly, in all specifications, the coefficient of creditor protection remains positively 
related to corporate bond market development and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Similarly, the coefficients of the proxies for shareholder protection are negative and 
statistically significant. Consequently, the results confirm that investor protection is 
important for capital market development. 
[Table 8] 
4.3 Development of the corporate bond market during a banking crisis 
According to the spare tire view, the capital market may provide financing during a 
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banking crisis. We therefore assume in Hypothesis 4 that in countries with higher creditor 
protection, corporate bond markets are more likely to develop during a banking crisis and 
act as a “spare tire.” Gormley et al. (2006) showed that the severe currency crisis in South 
Korea in 1997 triggered a freeze in newly increased bank lending and, consequently, 
stimulated the corporate bond market. One year later, the Korean bond market provided 
almost all funds raised by companies, whereas the surge in new issues was financed by 
household savings and the drawing of bank deposits. Levine et al. (2016) documented 
that stronger shareholder protection facilitates equity financing during a banking crisis. 
These findings indicate that stronger investor protection may predict capital market 
development following a systemic banking crisis. 
In Table 9, we evaluate the spare tire view and include the dummy variable Banking 
crisis. The coefficient for the dummy variable is positive and significant in all 
specifications. Hence, the results suggest that corporate bond markets develop during a 
banking crisis. However, the key explanatory variable is the interaction term between the 
crisis dummy and the measure of the strength of investor protection. In Table 9, the 
coefficient for the interaction term between the Banking crisis and Creditor rights is 
positive but insignificant. Consequently, we do not find evidence that corporate bond 
markets develop faster in countries with pre-crisis creditor protection during a systematic 
banking crisis, supporting Hypothesis 4. Similarly, in Table 9, columns (2) and (4), the 
coefficients for the interaction terms that include the Revised and Corrected ADRI are 
insignificant. In all specifications that include shareholder protection, only the interaction 
term that includes the variable Anti-self-dealing has a negative and statistically significant 
sign at the 10% level. We thus find only weak evidence that pre-crisis anti-self-dealing 
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protection is positively related to equity market development during a systematic banking 
crisis. These findings are consistent with those of Levine et al. (2016), who too employed 
the anti-self-dealing index. 
[Table 9] 
To examine the sensitivity of our results, we control for the economic development 
of the countries or regions. The results are shown in Table 10. For instance, in columns 
(1)-(2), we introduce the dummy variable Advanced, which takes the value of 1 if a 
country has a GDP per capita of more than 10,000 USD. We employ this dummy because 
there were more systematic banking crises in emerging markets than in developed 
countries from 1978 to 2011. Moreover, we assume that the capital markets may behave 
differently in advanced economies, compared to emerging countries, during a systematic 
banking crisis. 
Next, we interact the dummy variable with the variable Banking crisis and the 
proxies for investor protection. In column (1), the coefficient for the interaction term 
Region*Banking crisis is significant and positive, whereas in column (2), it loses 
significance. Hence, we find only weak evidence that corporate bond markets develop 
faster in advanced economies than in emerging markets during a banking crisis. We also 
employ a triple interaction term that includes proxies for investor protection. Only the 
coefficient for the interaction term that includes the variable Revised ADRI is statistically 
significant and negative in specification (1). The results indicate that pre-crisis 
shareholder protection proxied by the revised ADRI may predict equity market 
development during a systematic banking crisis. 
Next, we evaluate whether there are differences in the results depending on the 
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region of the crisis and its frequency. In columns (3)-(4), the variable Region controls for 
the Asian crisis of 19973, whereas in columns (5)-(6), the variable Region controls for the 
frequent systematic banking crises in Latin America from 1978 to 20114. In contrast to 
our expectations, we find that the coefficient for the interaction term between the 
variables Region and Banking crisis as well the coefficients for the triple interaction term 
including the proxies for investor protection are insignificant in all specifications. Thus, 
the results indicate that in neither of the regions are creditor or shareholder rights 
determined by capital market development during a banking crisis. The results support 
the findings of Gormley et al. (2006), who showed that in Korea, the corporate bond 
market was growing during the Asian crisis, but not as determined by the prevailing 
institutions. As a result, they showed that the allocation of the newly issued bonds was 
highly concentrated and credit screening was poor during the crisis in Korea. 
[Table 10] 
Figure 1 graphically presents the development of the corporate bond market relative 
to that of the equity market for all sample countries, the advanced economies, and the two 
regions. We can see that, on average, the corporate bond market starts to grow one year 
prior to the systematic banking crisis in the years 1970–2011. The corporate bond market 
expands during the crisis but starts to decline relative to the equity market after the crisis. 
The results are consistent with those of Allen et al. (2012), who showed that structural 
changes in the financial system following a crisis are only short-term effects. In our 
sample, only the corporate bond market in Latin American countries grows steadily 
 
3 The dummy variable controls for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore, which experienced a severe crisis from 1997 to 1998. 
4 The dummy variable controls for systematic banking crises in Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, and 
Peru from 1970 to 2011. 
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relative to the equity market, whereas the crisis does not seem to affect its development. 
[Figure 1] 
5. Conclusions 
We examine whether investor protection determines the development of the 
corporate bond market relative to that of the equity market. The results indicate that a 
country’s level of creditor rights predicts corporate bond market development. However, 
the results also show that shareholder rights positively affect equity market development. 
Moreover, the results show that financial reforms may predict corporate bond market 
development in countries with stronger creditor protection. Additionally, we find that the 
corporate bond market develops in response to systemic banking crises, although this is 
not determined by the level of pre-crisis creditor rights. The growth is, however, short-
term in character, which may explain the missing legal framework. In our opinion, these 
results indicate how investor protection affects capital market development and explains 
why some countries have a more developed corporate bond market than equity market. 
Our study fills the gap in the current literature by presenting the relationship between 
law and corporate bond market development. However, this study is not without 
limitations, which provide opportunities for future research. We do not discuss the 
tradeoff between the improvement of creditor rights and shareholder rights. It would be 
interesting to investigate the optimal structure of a country’s capital markets in relation to 
long-term economic growth. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Definitions of the main variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Financial Structure 
Corporate bond to stock 
The ratio of private bond market 
capitalization to stock market 
capitalization 
Beck et al. (2000, 2009); 
Čihák et al. (2012); 
World Bank 
 
Public bond to stock 
The ratio of public bond market 
capitalization to stock market 
capitalization 
Bond to stock 
The ratio of bond market 
capitalization to stock market 
capitalization 
Non-financial corporate 
bond to stock 
The ratio of the market 
capitalization of non-financial 
corporate bonds to stocks 
No. of listed bonds to 
stocks 
The ratio of the number of listed 
bonds to the number of listed 
stocks 
Law 
Creditor rights  
An index aggregating creditor 
rights. The index ranges from 0 
(weakest creditor rights) to 4 
(strongest creditor rights) 
Djankov et al. (2007) 
Revised ADRI 
A revised index of the original 
anti-director rights index, which 
aggregates shareholder protection 
in over 100 articles, including 
shareholder voting and minority 
protection 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Djankov et al. (2008b) 
Corrected ADRI 
A corrected index of the original 
anti-director rights index, with 
improved data collection, coding 
and documentation 
Spamann (2010) 
Anti-self-dealing 
An index summarizing the 
strength of minority shareholders 
in limiting expropriation by 
corporate insiders 
Djankov et al. (2008a) 
Anti-takeover provisions 
An index measuring the extent of 
anti-takeover regulations across 
countries 
Nenova (2006) 
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Bond covenant  
An index aggregating 
heterogeneous rights attached to 
bonds 
Miller and Reisel (2012) 
Information disclosure  
An index created by examining 
and rating companies' annual 
reports on their inclusion or 
omission on 90 items, with a 
higher number indicating more 
disclosure 
International Accounting 
and Auditing Trends, 
Center for Financial 
Analysis and Research  
 
Debt enforcement 
Equals the logarithm of the 
number of days to resolve a 
payment dispute through courts  
Djankov et al. (2008a) 
Rule of Law  
An index for rule of law, which 
captures perceptions of the extent 
to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence, ranging from 
0 to 100 
World Bank 
Governance    
Corruption 
An index for corruption, which 
captures perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and 
private interests, ranging from 0 
to 100. 
World Bank 
Regulatory quality 
An index for regulatory quality,  
which captures perceptions of the 
ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector 
development, ranging from 0 to 
100. 
World Bank  
Voice and accountability 
An index for voice and 
accountability, which  
captures perceptions of the extent 
to which a country's citizens are 
able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as 
World Bank 
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freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media, 
ranging from 0 to 100. 
Financial Reforms 
Financial reforms 
An index of financial reforms, 
normalized to be between 0 and 1  
 
Abiad et al. (2008) Reform 
Dummy=1 if the 1st difference 
term of financial reform index is 
higher than 0 
Crises 
Banking crises 
A dummy variable that equals 1 
during a severe systematic 
banking crisis and zero otherwise. 
Laeven and Valencia 
(2012) 
Macroeconomic control variables 
GDP  
Logarithm of gross national 
product (current US dollars)  
 
 
World Development 
Indicators 
 
GDP per capita 
Logarithm of gross national 
product per capita 
Inflation 
Annual growth rate of consumer 
price index 
GFCF 
The ratio of gross fixed capital 
formation to GDP 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Corporate 
bond to 
stock 
Public 
bond to 
stock 
Bond to 
stock 
Non-financial 
corporate bond 
to stock 
No. of 
listed 
bonds to 
stocks 
Creditor 
rights 
Revised 
ADRI 
Corrected 
ADRI 
Anti-
self-
dealing 
Anti-
takeover 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean 0.58 1.16 1.44 0.05 1.05 1.8 3.37 3.74 0.44 0.46 
Min. 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 1 2 0.08 0.04 
Max. 5.68 176 9.52 0.72 2.21 4 5 6 1 0.97 
Std. Dev. 0.75 5.76 1.45 0.09 0.37 1.18 1.13 0.95 0.23 0.24 
Obs. 856 987 856 273 701 4,080 3,692 2,340 3,692 2,496 
Panel B: Correlations 
Corporate bond to 
stock 
1          
Public bond to 
stock 
0.41* 
(0.00) 
1         
Bond to stock 
0.79* 
(0.00) 
0.88* 
(0.00) 
1        
Non-financial 
corporate bond to 
stock 
0.46* 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
0.36* 
(0.00) 
1       
No. of listed 
bonds to stocks 
0.54* 
(0.00) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.35* 
(0.00) 
0.21* 
(0.01) 
1      
Creditor rights 
0.15* 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.77) 
0.32* 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.30) 
1     
Revised ADRI 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
-0.11* 
(0.00) 
-0.29* 
(0.00) 
0.28* 
(0.00) 
-0.13* 
(0.00) 
0.20* 
(0.00) 
1    
Corrected ADRI 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
-0.19* 
(0.00) 
-0.22* 
(0.00) 
0.15* 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.82) 
0.17* 
(0.00) 
0.69* 
(0.00) 
1   
Anti-self-dealing 
-0.24* 
(0.00) 
-0.09* 
(0.00) 
-0.33* 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.27) 
-0.22* 
(0.00) 
0.30* 
(0.00) 
0.56* 
(0.00) 
0.35* 
(0.00) 
1  
Anti-takeover 
0.06 
(0.13) 
-0.02 
(0.57) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
0.12 
(0.08) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
0.34* 
(0.00) 
0.49* 
(0.00) 
0.37* 
(0.00) 
0.51* 
(0.00) 
1 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Creditor rights, shareholder rights and bond vs stock market development 
This table reports results for the random-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978–2011. The dependent variables are, in specifications (1)-(4), 
corporate bond market capitalization, in (5)-(8) the ratios of public bond market and, in (5)-(8), the ratios of total bond market capitalization to stock market 
capitalization. The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection, which are defined in Table A1. The macroeconomic control variables are 
log of GDP, log of GDP per capita, inflation and gross fixed capital formation to GDP. In all regressions, constant and time dummies are included but are not 
reported for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Corporate bond market  Public bond market  Total bond market 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Creditor rights 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.34***  0.20 0.02 0.13 -0.08  0.42*** 0.36*** 044*** 0.36*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.26) (0.08) (0.28) (0.38)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Revised ADRI -0.22***     -0.84***     -0.65**    
 (0.08)     (0.26)     (0.17)    
Corrected ADRI 
 -0.07*     -0.15**     -0.22**   
 (0.04)     (0.07)     (0.10)   
Anti-self-dealing   -1.18***     -2.23*     -2.77***  
   (0.36)     (1.26)     (0.76)  
Anti-takeover    -0.76*     1.77     -0.86 
    (0.41)     (2.25)     (0.99) 
GDP -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09*  -0.20 -0.10 -0.23 -0.27  -0.25** -0.16 -0.21** -0.22* 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.20) (0.09) (0.22) (0.34)  (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) 
GDP per capita 0.10* 0.11 0.08 0.09  -0.32 -0.16 -0.33 -0.37  0.05 -0.04 -0.00 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.22) (0.10) (0.24) (0.35)  (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) 
Inflation 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00  0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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GFGF -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01**  -0.13*** -0.04*** -0.11** -0.14**  -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 
 (0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Obs. 772 698 772 631  867 731 867 648  772 698 772 631 
R2 0.15 0.09 0.19 0.08  0.21 0.01 0.10 0.03  0.21 0.07 0.19 0.07 
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Table 3 
Investor protections and alternative measures of corporate bond market 
development 
This table reports the results for the random-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978–2011. 
The dependent variables are in specifications (1)-(4) the ratio of number of listed bonds to stocks, in (5)- (8) 
the ratio of non-financial corporate bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization. The 
independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection, which are defined in Table A1. All 
regressions include macroeconomic control variables as specified in Table 2. Year dummies and constants 
are also not shown for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 
5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
No. of listed bonds  
Non-financial 
corporate bond market 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Creditor rights 0.04* 0.05** 0.04* 0.04*  0.02* 0.04*** 0.03* 0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Revised  
ADRI 
-
0.08* 
    0.02    
 (0.05)     (0.02)    
Corrected  
ADRI 
 
-
0.10*** 
    
-
0.09*** 
  
  (0.02)     (0.01)   
Anti-self-
dealing 
  
-
0.32* 
    -0.03  
   (0.19)     (0.10)  
Anti-takeover    -0.09     -0.11 
    (0.20)     (0.10) 
Obs. 633 583 633 509  255 237 255 223 
R2 0.124 0.154 0.124 0.112  0.197 0.502 0.203 0.213 
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Table 4 
Fixed effects estimation of investor protection and corporate bond market 
development 
This table reports the results for the fixed-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978–2011. 
The dependent variables are in specifications (1) Total bond market capitalization to stock market 
capitalization, (2) Private bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization, (3) Non-financial 
corporate bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization, (4) Number of listed corporate bonds to 
number of listed stock, (5) Private bond market capitalization to GDP, (6) Non-financial corporate bond 
market capitalization to GDP. The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection, 
which are defined in Table A1. The macroeconomic control variables are log of GDP, log of GDP per 
capita, inflation, gross fixed capital formation to GDP and in specification (5) and (6) stock market 
capitalization to GDP. In all regressions, constant and time dummies are included but are not reported for 
brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
levels, respectively. 
 
Total bond 
market. 
Private 
bond 
market 
Non-
financial 
corp. bond 
market 
No. of 
listed 
bonds 
Private 
bond 
market 
Non-
financial 
corp. bond 
market 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor 
rights 
0.002*** 0.56*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 6.28*** 0.05*** 
 (0.52) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (2.32) (0.01) 
Corrected 
ADRI 
-0.07 -0.03 -0.10*** -0.10*** 1.45 -0.10*** 
 (0.12) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (1.61) (0.01) 
Stock 
market 
    -0.03** -0.00*** 
     (0.01) (0.00) 
GDP 1.59** 0.84** 0.36*** 0.62*** 29.46*** 0.42*** 
 (0.80) (0.40) (0.07) (0.17) (11.20) (0.07) 
GDP per 
capita 
-0.22** -0.94** -0.41*** -0.56*** -15.71 -0.47*** 
 (0.93) (0.47) (0.08) (0.19) (13.03) (0.08) 
Inflation -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GFCF -0.05*** -0.02*** 0.00 0.00 -0.26 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) 
Obs. 698 698 237 548 698 237 
R2 0.08 0.07 0.49 0.11 0.23 0.55 
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Table 5 
Legal origins, bond covenants and information disclosure, and corporate bond market development 
This table reports the results for the random-effects and fixed-effects regressions for 42 countries over the period 1978–2011. The dependent variable is the ratio 
of corporate bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization. The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection, and we 
additionally control for countries’ legal origin, bond covenant, information disclosure and days of debt contract enforcement. All variables are defined in Table 
A1. All regressions include macroeconomic control variables as specified in Table 2. Year dummies and constants are also not shown for brevity. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Creditor rights 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) 
Revised ADRI -0.13*    -0.08      
 (0.06)    (0.17)      
Corrected ADRI  -0.08*    -0.07   -0.02 -0.04 
  (0.04)    (0.06)   (0.06) (0.07) 
Anti-self-dealing   -1.08**    -0.81    
   (0.05)    (0.82)    
Anti-takeover    0.31    1.10   
    (0.56)    (0.71)   
English origin -0.86*** -1.05*** -0.59 -1.00*** -0.2** -0.89** -0.53 -1.17*** - - 
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) (0.52) (0.37) - - 
French origin -0.54* -0.53 -0.54* -0.21 -0.46 -0.44 -0.38 -0.16 - - 
 (0.31) (0.34) (0.31) (0.35) (0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.36) - - 
German origin -0.59* -0.33 -0.59* -0.23 -0.47 -0.48 -0.47 -0.13 - - 
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 (0.33) (0.38) (0.32) (0.35) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) - - 
Restrictive bond covenant     -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05  - 
     (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  - 
Information disclosure     -0.02 -0.02 -0.-2 -0.02  - 
     (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  - 
Enforcement     0.09 0.10 0.10 0.18  - 
     (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13)  - 
Country FE N N N N N N N N Y Y 
Obs. 772 698 772 631 576 576 576 494 698 576 
R2 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.52 0.09 0.10 
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Table 6 Other governance factors and corporate bond market development 
This table reports the results for the fixed-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978–2011. The dependent variable is the ratio of corporate bond 
market capitalization to stock market capitalization. The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection, and we additionally control for 
countries’ governance factors in terms of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality and voice and accountability. All variables are defined in Table A1. All 
regressions include macroeconomic control variables as specified in Table 2. Year dummies and constants are also not shown for brevity. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Corporate bond market  Non-financial corporate bond market 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Creditor rights 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.12**  0.10*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 90.01） 
Corrected ADRI -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07  -0.12*** -0.11** -0.11** -0.11** -0.12*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.44) (0.04) 
Corruption -0.29    -0.15  -0.10**    -0.11** 
 (0.27)    (0.32)  (0.04)    (0.04) 
Rule of law  -0.19   0.11   -0.03   0.00 
  (0.17)   (0.22)   (0.03)   (0.05) 
Regulatory quality   -0.39  -0.39    -0.17***  -0.11** 
   (0.28)  (0.29)    (0.04)  (0.05) 
Voice and accountability    -0.15 -0.11     -0.00 0.06 
    (0.19) (0.22)     (0.06) (0.04) 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 436 436 436 436 436  182 182 182 182 182 
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R2 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04  0.54 0.49 0.53 0.49 0.56 
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Table 7 Effects of financial reform on corporate bond market development 
This table reports the results for the random-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 19782011. 
The dependent variable is the ratio pf corporate bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization. 
The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection and information disclosure. All 
variables are defined in Table A1. The dummy variable Treated equals 1 if the unit is in the treated group 
and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Post_reform equals 1 if year t is the next year after financial reform 
and 0 otherwise. All regressions include macroeconomic control variables as specified in Table 2. Constant 
and year dummies are also not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 
10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor rights 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Revised ADR -0.13 -0.16     
 (0.09) (0.11)     
Corrected ADR   -0.10 -0.12*   
   (0.07) (0.07)   
Anti-self-dealing     -1.01** -1.00** 
     (0.39) (0.45) 
Treated 0.25*** 0.47*** 0.35*** 0.48*** 0.25*** 0.47*** 
*Post-reform (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) 
Information disclosure  0.01**  0.01**  0.01** 
* Post-reform  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Post-reform 0.08** -0.68* 0.08* -0.67* 0.07* -0.70* 
 (0.03) (0.36) (0.04) (0.36) (0.04) (0.37) 
Obs. 581 487 534 487 581 487 
R2 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.30 
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Table 8 Financial reform, creditor rights, and corporate bond market development 
This table reports the results of the random-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978–2011. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of corporate bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization. 
The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection and information disclosure. The 
dummy variable Treated equals 1 if the unit is in the treated group and 0 otherwise. The dummy 
Post_reform equals 1 if year t is the next year after financial reform and 0 otherwise. All variables are 
defined in Table A1. All regressions include macroeconomic control variables as specified in Table 2. Year 
dummies and constants are also not shown for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor rights 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Revised ADR -0.20**   -0.30**   
 (0.09)   (0.12)   
Corrected ADR   -0.15**   -0.18**  
  (0.07)   (0.08)  
Anti-self-dealing   -1.12***   -1.45*** 
   (0.37)   (0.46) 
Post-reform 0.13 0.08 0.26*** 0.25* 0.03 0.22** 
 (0.13) (0.19) (0.10) (0.15) (0.18) (0.11) 
Information disclosure    0.01 0.00 0.02 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Creditor rights 
*Post-reform 
0.07* 0.06* 0.12***    
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)    
Revised ADRI 
*Post-reform 
-0.03      
(0.04)      
Corrected ADRI 
*Post-reform 
 -0.01     
 (0.05)     
Anti-self-dealing 
*Post-reform 
  -0.69***    
  (0.18)    
Creditor rights 
*Post-reform  
*Information disclosure 
   0.00** 0.00* 0.00*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Revised ADRI 
* Post-reform  
*Information disclosure 
   -0.00*   
   (0.00)   
Corrected ADR 
*Post-reform  
*Information disclosure 
    0.000  
    (0.00)  
Anti-self-dealing 
*Post-reform  
*Information disclosure 
     -0.01*** 
     (0.00) 
Obs. 564 517 564 470 470 470 
R2 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.19 0.09 0.25 
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Table 9 Systematic banking crises and corporate bond market development 
This table reports the results of the random-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978–2011. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of corporate bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization. 
The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection. The dummy variable Banking 
crisis equals 1 in the year of a systematic banking crisis and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table 
A1. All regressions include macroeconomic control variables as specified in Table 2. Year dummies and 
constants are also not shown for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Creditor rights 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37** 0.36*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) 
Revised ADRI -0.13* -0.13*     
 (0.06) (0.06)     
Corrected ADRI   -0.07 -0.08   
   (0.06) (0.06)   
Anti-self-dealing     -0.86* -0.85** 
     (0.49) (0.43) 
Banking crisis 0.36*** 0.34* 0.41*** 0.40* 0.36*** 0.22* 
 (0.05) (0.19) (0.06) (0.21) (0.05) (0.12) 
Creditor rights * 
Banking crisis 
 0.00  0.05  0.02 
 (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.05) 
Revised ADRI * 
Banking crisis 
 0.00     
 (0.05)     
Corrected ADRI * 
Banking crisis 
   0.03   
   (0.06)   
Anti-self-dealing * 
Banking crisis 
     -0.39* 
     (0.23) 
Obs. 663 663 589 589 663 663 
R2 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
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Table 10 Banking crises and corporate bond market development 
This table reports the results of the random-effects regression for 42 countries over the period 1978–2011. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of corporate bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization. 
The independent variables proxy for creditor and shareholder protection. The dummy variable Banking 
crisis equals 1 in the year of a systematic banking crisis and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Region 
equals 1 if the country is an advanced economy in specifications (1)-(2), for the Asian crisis of 1997 in (3)-
(4) and for the Latin American crisis in (5)-(6) and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Table A1. All 
regressions include macroeconomic control variables as specified in Table 2. Year dummies and constants 
are also not shown for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 
5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 Advanced  East Asian  Latin American 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Creditor rights 0.37*** 0.42***  0.41*** 0.42***  0.42*** 0.42*** 
 (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) 
Revised ADRI -0.10*   -0.11   -0.11*  
 (0.05)   (0.09)   (0.06)  
Anti-self-dealing  -0.80*   -0.82*   -0.80* 
  (0.39)   (0.49)   (0.43) 
Region *Banking 
crisis 
2.22** -0.01  0.12 0.07  -0.33 -0.31 
(0.93) (0.71)  (0.35) (0.25)  (0.34) (0.36) 
Region*Creditor 
rights *Banking 
crisis 
0.21 0.01  0.42 0.05  0.14 0.18 
(0.16) (0.15)  (0.14) (0.19)  (0.23) (0.23) 
Region*Revised 
ADRI *Banking 
crisis 
-0.55**   -0.02   0.06  
(0.28)   (0.11)   (0.10)  
Region*Anti-self-
dealing *Banking 
crisis 
 1.22   -0.05   0.48 
 (1.72)   (0.56)   (0.86) 
Obs. 663 663  663 663  663 663 
R2 0.21 0.22  0.18 0.21  0.20 0.22 
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Figure 1 Relative capitalization of the corporate market to stock market during 
systemic banking crises 
The Y-axis represents the average ratio of private bond market capitalization to stock market capitalization; 
the X-axis represents the years before, during and after banking crises. We assume that banking crises 
occur at year 0; thus, year = -2 represents two years before banking crises, and so forth. The crisis period is 
covered by the shadow boxes. Advanced economies are economies with a GDP per capita over 10,000 
USD; East Asian economies include seven economies that experienced severe crises from 1997–98. Latin 
American economies include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
 
